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Abstract
This paper undertakes a careful examination of the concept of
conditional probability and its use. The ideas are then applied to
resolve a conceptual puzzle related to Savage’s “Sure-Thing Principle.”
1 Introduction
This paper undertakes a careful examination of the concept of conditional
probability and its use (Section 3). The conclusions (Sections 4 and 5),
while perhaps obvious once pointed out, have heretofore not been universally
appreciated. The ideas are applied to resolve (Section 6) a conceptual puzzle
(Section 2) related to Savage’s “Sure-Thing Principle” (STP). We conclude
(Section 7) by emphasizing that STP is a principle of rationality, not a logical
principle.
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12 The Sure-Thing Puzzle
The Sure-Thing Principle (Savage 1954) says that if a decision maker would
take a certain action if he knew that an event E obtained, and also if he
knew that its negation ˜E obtained, then he should take that action even if
he knows nothing about E. Savage illustrates this as follows: “A businessman
contemplates buying a certain piece of property. He considers the outcome of
the next presidential election relevant. So, to clarify the matter to himself, he
asks whether he would buy if he knew that the Democratic candidate were
going to lose, and decides that he would. Similarly, he considers whether
he would buy if he knew that the Republican candidate were going to lose,
and again ﬁnds that he would. Seeing that he would buy in either event, he
decides that he should buy, even though he does not know which event will
obtain. ... It is all too seldom that a decision can be arrived at on the basis of
this principle, but I know of almost no other extralogical principle governing
decisions that ﬁnds such ready acceptance” (p. 21; slightly paraphrased).
Indeed, in spite of attacks that have ensued throughout the years, the sure-
thing principle does sound very compelling.
Consider now a similar story, diﬀering from the above only in that there
are three serious candidates—as indeed happened in 1912, when Theodore
Roosevelt ran as an independent, against a Republican (Taft) and a Demo-
crat (Wilson). Again, the businessman asks himself whether he would buy if
he knew that the Democratic candidate was going to lose, and decides that
he would; and he would also buy if he knew that the Republican candidate
was going to lose. One of these two events will surely obtain, so as above, it
would appear that he should buy even though he does not know which event
will obtain.
But a closer look reveals that in this case, the reasoning is fallacious.
Suppose the businessman assigns respective prior probabilities of 2/7,3/7,
and 2/7 to the Republican, Roosevelt, and the Democrat winning; and, that
he believes that Roosevelt’s progressive economic policies, if implemented,
will lead to a period of prosperity that will make the value of the property
rise dramatically. He decides to buy if and only if he thinks that Roosevelt’s
2chances exceed 1/2. If he then learns that the Democrat will lose, his prob-
ability for Roosevelt winning goes to 3/5, so he buys. Similarly if he learns
that the Republican will lose. But if he learns nothing, then his probability
for Roosevelt winning remains at 3/7, so he does not buy.
To be sure, this situation is not quite the same as Savage’s, because here,
unlike above, both the Democrat and the Republican might lose; Roosevelt
might win. But that seems irrelevant; on its face, the reasoning leading to
the conclusion appears no less compelling than before.
Nevertheless, Savage’s principle—when the events in question are disjoint—
does seem compelling, whereas the example shows that when the events have
a non-empty intersection, it is not. Why? What is the role of disjointness—
when and why is it important? Can we formulate and justify a principle that
will distinguish between these two cases?
3 Conditioning: The Question
For the moment, let us put aside the Sure-Thing Puzzle, and turn to a careful
examination of conditional probabilities.
Suppose that people who test positive for HIV have a ﬁve-year survival
probability1 of, say,2 40%; in technical terminology, the ﬁve-year survival
probability, conditional on testing positive for HIV, is 40%. Suppose further
that your friend tells you that he just tested positive for HIV. What is your
probability for his being alive in ﬁve years?
The answer that comes to mind is, “Well, 40%, of course; isn’t that what
you just told me? Isn’t that what ‘conditional probability’ means?” But a
closer examination casts doubt on this answer. You know more than that
your friend tested positive for HIV; you know that he told you3 so. That could
signify, for example, that his situation is worse than that of the average HIV-
1For example, this would be the case if 40% of all people who test positive for HIV are
alive ﬁve years after the test, and no signiﬁcant medical advances are expected.
2This number is purely hypothetical, for illustration only; the authors have no idea
what the true probability is.
3Here we rule out the possibility that your friend lied. If this is admitted, the situation
becomes even more complex.
3positive testee, that he already has symptoms of AIDS, and that he needs
your support here and now. Alternatively, it could conceivably signify other
things, in the opposite direction. Either way, the simple answer of 40% is
likely to be incorrect.
For another example, we turn to the celebrated text of Hodges and
Lehman (1964), who illustrate the concept of conditional probability as fol-
lows: “Suppose a poker player happens, by accident, to catch a glimpse of
the hand dealt to an opponent. The glimpse is too ﬂeeting for individual
cards to be distinguishable, but the player does perceive that all the cards
are red. It is then certain that the opponent cannot have ‘four of a kind,’ as
that would require him to have at least two black cards, and one also feels
that the chance of the opponent holding a ‘heart ﬂush’ is now higher than it
was before the new information was obtained. Denoting by R the set of all
poker hands formed of red cards only, what is now of interest is the condi-
tional probability4, given that R has occurred” (pp. 77–78; abbreviated and
slightly paraphrased).
Again, that is wrong. You know more than that the opponent’s hand is
in R; you know that you caught a ﬂeeting glimpse of his hand, just enough
to allow you to conclude that his hand is in R. That could signify that he
was careless because his hand was hopeless, or that he purposely allowed you
to glimpse his hand, perhaps to discourage you from bidding against him, or
numerous other possible reasons. In any event, it need not be the case that
your probabilities are the original probabilities, conditioned on R.
The reader may now begin to feel uncomfortable. “Come,” he may say,
“you are quibbling. Whenever you get information, you must get it in some
way. The formal theory abstracts away from such practical matters, and
conditions only on the information itself, not on the way it was obtained. In
practical applications, one must modify the conclusions to take these consid-
erations into account, but the formal theory does not and cannot do so.”
But that will not pass muster. There is no distinction between “infor-
mation” and the way it is obtained. The way it is obtained is part of the
information; ignoring it may greatly aﬀect the probabilities, as we have seen.
4The original text here has the word “frequency.”
4How can we sort this out? Speciﬁcally, on what should one condition?
4 Conditioning: The Answer
Suppose you learn that an event E obtains. The way in which you learn
it is called a signal, denoted s. In the HIV example, E is that your friend
tested positive for HIV, and s is that he told you so. In the Hodges–Lehman
poker example, E is that all your opponent’s cards are red, and s is that by
accident, you caught a ﬂeeting glimpse of his hand and perceived that all the
cards are red. Having received the signal s, you conclude that E obtains; s
is a suﬃcient condition for E.
As we have seen, receiving the signal s does not in general justify condi-
tioning on E. What, then, does? The answer is that to justify conditioning
on E, the signal s must be necessary and suﬃcient for E.
Though s is suﬃcient for E in both our examples, it is necessary in
neither. If your friend told you that he tested positive, then indeed he tested
positive; but he could also have tested positive without telling you so. If
you caught a glimpse of your opponent’s hand and perceived it to be all red,
then indeed it is all red; but it could also be all red without your catching a
glimpse of it.
Signals that are necessary and suﬃcient for the corresponding events are
quite common. If a lab technician routinely testing blood specimens ﬁnds
a certain specimen to be HIV positive, then his probability is 40% that the
person from whom the specimen was taken will live ﬁve years. The reason
is that if the specimen had been negative, the lab technician would have
known that, as well. More generally, the signal is likely to be necessary and
suﬃcient if it is the result of a test that is applied indiscriminately, under all
circumstances—as distinguished from information that one may or may not
get.
When the signal s is only suﬃcient for E, but not necessary, then though
one knows E, one cannot condition on E. Rather, one conditions on having
received the signal s—i.e., on everything one knows. Of course this includes
E, but it is not limited to E: since the signal is not necessary for E, one
5knows more than just E. This matter will be clariﬁed in the next section,
where we provide a formal treatment.
5 Formal Treatment
The standard epistemologic model (e.g., Aumann and Heifetz 2002) consists
of a ﬁnite5 set Ω, whose members are called states of the world or simply
states, and whose subsets are called events; a probability measure P on Ω;
and a partition K of Ω, whose atoms are called information sets. Here K
represents the decision maker’s information: if the true state of the world is
ω, then he does not know that, but knows only that the true state is in the
information set K(ω) ∈ K to which ω belongs; we say that the decision maker
considers each member ν of K(ω) to be possible at ω. The measure P is the
decision maker’s prior probability estimate on the state of the world—before
he gets his information K(ω).
In this formalism, conditioning appears as follows: If the true state of the
world is ω, then after the information is received, the decision maker assigns
probability 0 to states outside of K(ω), and probability P({ν})/P(K(ω))
to states ν in K(ω); that is, he assigns probability P(A|K(ω)) ≡ P(A ∩
K(ω))/P(K(ω)) to any event A. This is the conditional probability of A,
given K(ω).
It is often convenient to use the equivalent representation of information
by “signals.” A signalling function s is a function on Ω: if ω is the true state
of the world, then the decision maker receives6 the signal s(ω). The informa-
tion consists of the received signal. Therefore the information partition K is
generated by s; i.e., the atoms of K are the events s−1(s) = {ω : s(ω) = s}
for each possible signal s in the range of the function s. Indeed, if the deci-
sion maker considers ν to be possible at ω, then the signal s(ν) at ν must
be the same as the signal s(ω) at ω (if the signals were diﬀerent, they would
distinguish between ν and ω). Conditioning on a speciﬁc signal s is thus
5Finiteness is assumed for simplicity only.
6It is possible, of course, that in some states no signal at all is received; but we shall
simply call this the “null signal,” and so, formally, get a signal for every state.
6precisely the same as conditioning on the information set: at each state ω
where s(ω) = s we have K(ω) = s−1(s), so P(A|K(ω)) = P(A|s−1(s)).
Let E be a distinguished event. In the examples above, E is the event
that your friend tested positive for HIV, or your opponent holds a poker hand
that is all red. The actual signal s that was received (your friend telling you
that he tested positive, or you seeing that all the cards are red) is suﬃcient
for the event E, but not necessary. In our formalism, that translates to
s−1(s) $ E; one computes P(A|s−1(s))—not P(A|E).
To elaborate further, when there is just one way to know E—i.e., only
one signal s such that s−1(s) ⊂ E—then s−1(s) = K(E), which is the event
of “knowing E”; in this case we condition on K(E) rather than on E. If there
is more than one way to know E—i.e., s−1(si) ⊂ E for i = 1,2,... (if your
friend does not tell you, his spouse might)—then the conditioning is done on
each s−1(si) separately, according to the signal si actually received (in this
case K(E) = ∪is−1(si)).
Summing up: To condition on an event, it is not enough simply to know
that it obtains. One can condition only on one’s information set—the set
of all states that one considers possible, no more and no less. Equivalently,
in terms of signals, once a signalling function is deﬁned—i.e., the precise
signal received is deﬁned for all states—one conditions on the event that one
particular signal is observed.7
6 Resolving the Sure-Thing Puzzle
At the outset, note that in Savage’s formal treatment, the Sure-Thing Prin-
ciple is not an axiom; it is derived from other, more fundamental postulates
(1954, p. 24, Theorem 2). The current discussion refers not to this for-
mal derivation, but rather to the principle considered on its own merits, as
discussed by Savage in the passage cited at the beginning of Section 2 above.
We come now to the puzzle itself. Conditional decisions are analogous
7What needs to be speciﬁed precisely is in what states the signal s is received and in
what states it is not—i.e., what is the set s−1(s). In brief, the model must be complete
and coherent.
7to conditional probabilities: one must condition not on an event occurring,
or even on knowing that the event occurs, but on all one’s information, no
more and no less.
The sure-thing principle is then based on the following, more fundamen-
tal principle: Suppose we have a process whereby a decision maker gathers
information. Suppose that under all circumstances, the information that the
decision-maker will obtain will lead him to take a certain decision d. Then
he may decide on d without obtaining the information.8
In the three-candidate version of Savage’s example (Section 2), this rea-
soning does not apply. It is true that either the Republican or the Democrat
must lose; and after the elections, the businessman will know one of these
two eventualities. But it is not true that after the elections, the businessman
will know that the Republican lost, no more and no less, or will know that
the Democrat lost, no more and no less.
For instance, if he listens to the radio, he will know exactly which candi-
date won; and depending on this, he will not invariably buy. Even if he is
told either that the Republican lost (RL) or that the Democrat lost (DL),
and nothing else, he will in fact know more. He will know that he was told
RL or told DL. It is not possible that he is told RL if and only if RL occurs
and that he is told DL if and only if DL occurs. Either the event “RL” of
being told RL is strictly contained in the event RL, or the event “DL” of
being told DL is strictly contained in DL, or both; the events “RL” and “DL”
are disjoint, whereas the events RL and DL are not (see Figure 1).
Suppose, for example, that if Roosevelt wins, the businessman is told RL
or DL with half-half probabilities. If he knows this, his conditional probabil-
ity that Roosevelt won is in either case 3/7, so he will not buy the property.
And if he does not know this, what exactly does he know? Without spec-
ifying what the businessman knows as a function of the circumstances, the
model is incoherent.
In the two-candidate example, he can buy without knowing the outcome
of the election. But in the three-candidate example, there is no way to set
up the information-gathering process so that the businessman will buy under
8This is the formulation sought in the last sentence of Section 2.





Figure 1: The three-candidates example
all circumstances.
Formally, an information-gathering process is modelled as a “signalling
function.” Thus in terms of signals, the sure-thing principle may be formu-
lated as follows: Given a signalling function, if the decision maker makes the
same decision no matter what signal he gets, then he can make that same
decision without getting any signal.
7 The Logical Sure-Thing Principle
Suppose we wish to establish a proposition p. If q is another proposition,
and we show that q entails p, and also that “not q” entails p, then p follows.
Let us call this the Logical Sure-Thing Principle (LSTP); it is often used in
mathematics, as well as in other applications of logic.
On the face of it, Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle (STP) appears similar.
But in fact, they are quite diﬀerent. For one thing, LSTP is a logical truism;
it follows from fundamental principles of logical reasoning. Speciﬁcally, it is
a theorem of the propositional calculus. In contrast, STP is a desideratum
of rational behavior, but it is not logically necessary. A decision maker
who violates STP may be acting irrationally, but he is not acting illogically.
Savage himself (1954, p. 21) refers to STP as an “extralogical principle.”
For another thing, while disjointness is essential for STP, it is not needed
9for LSTP. Indeed, if p entails q, and p′ entails q, then p ∨ p′ entails q—
whether p and p′ are compatible or not. Equivalently, in set-theoretic terms,
if P ⊂ Q and P ′ ⊂ Q, then P ∪ P ′ ⊂ Q—whether P and P ′ are disjoint or
not. We suspect that one reason that people mistakenly extend STP to the
non-disjoint case is that for LSTP this extension is legitimate.
To see that STP is not a logical truism, suppose that you consider reading
a certain book. If you know it is written by A, you will read it, and if you
know it is by B, you will read it. But that does not entail that you will
read it if you know that it is by either A or B. Knowing the identity of the
writer is important for appreciating the book (for instance, it brings to mind
associations to other works by the same author).
To be sure, this is a little unusual, because the quality of the conse-
quence (the reading of the book) is directly aﬀected by the decision maker’s
knowledge—rather than the usual case, in which the knowledge only aﬀects
his estimate of the likelihood that this or that state obtains. The knowledge
is important for its own sake: what matters is not what you know, but that
you know it.
When that happens, Savage’s STP indeed need not apply. But when the
knowledge does not aﬀect the consequence, as in most decision problems,
STP does sound eminently reasonable.
References
Aumann, R. J. and A. Heifetz (2002), “Incomplete Information,” in Handbook
of Game Theory, with Economic Applications, Volume 3, edited by R. J.
Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2002, pp. 1665–1686.
Hodges, J. L., Jr., and E. L. Lehman (1964), Basic Concepts of Probability
and Statistics, San Francisco: Holden-Day.
Savage, L. J. (1954), The Foundations of Statistics, New York: John Wiley.
10